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Abstract 
In today’s industries, asset maintenance plays a strategic role in sustaining the organization’s competitiveness 
through enhancing equipment availability, reliability and productivity.  In recent years, considerable research 
work on asset management (AM) has been undertaken. This stems from the fact that AM considers the assets life 
cycle where the operational and maintenance phase is important. Core to asset maintenance is the proposed use 
of various risk assessment techniques/tools. These tools propose a structured approach through which critical 
failure modes are identified, analyzed and mitigated. Commonly applied risk assessment tools in AM include the 
failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA), static/dynamic fault tree analysis (FTA) and static/dynamic Bayesian 
networks (BN). Despite considerable effort directed towards developing individual risk assessment (RA) tools, 
few papers propose a structured framework that allows selection of tools best suited for the organization, 
considering the often varying business or operational context. Thus, this paper proposes a conceptual risk 
assessment tool selection model. Based on an extensive literature review, the model enumerates generic selection 
criteria accounting for the well-known ‘factors of production’, i.e. manpower (personnel), machines (assets 
complexity), methods (procedures), and materials (tools and aids). Next, the selection criteria are assigned 
priority weights based on the analytic network process (ANP) methodology that accounts for the type of RA tool 
and business context. Finally, applicability of the conceptual model as an audit tool where the organization 
assesses its suitability against the varied RA tools is demonstrated. 
Keywords: Asset management, Risk assessment, Selection model, ANP 
1. Introduction 
In the last few decades, the business environment organizations operate in has undergone 
considerable changes. As such, organizations are nowadays confronted by challenges such as 
changing market dynamics and shifting consumer preferences. Moreover, operational and 
maintenance (O&M) costs are increasingly becoming an important aspect that cannot be 
ignored. Indeed research shows that the O&M cost constitutes as much as 70% of the asset’s 
total cost of ownership [Koronios et al., 2007]. As such, the maintenance function is no longer 
perceived as “necessary evil”, but an important contributor to the organizations 
competitiveness [Van Horenbeek, 2014].  
Thus to remain competitive, organizations are increasingly adopting asset management 
strategies where all phases in the asset’s life cycle are considered, i.e. right from inception to 
disposal. In literature, several definitions for AM are discussed. One such definition is the 
PAS-55:2008. Here, AM is defined as “the systematic and coordinated practices through 
which the organization optimally and sustainably manages its assets and asset systems, their 
associated performance, risks and expenditures over the asset’s life-cycle for the purpose of 
achieving the organization strategic plan.” This definition clearly situates risk management in 
the context of management of technical assets.  
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In risk management, a wide range of risk assessment (RA) techniques/tools have been 
developed and applied for in diverse sectors such as finance, insurance, and more recently, 
asset management [IEC, 2009]. In asset management, such techniques present a structured 
approach where asset failures are systematically identified, analyzed, evaluated and mitigated. 
Often, mitigation is achieved through implementing appropriate maintenance policy(s), e.g. 
condition based maintenance (CBM). In AM, commonly applied risk assessment techniques 
include the failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA), fault tree analysis (FTA) and Bayesian 
network (BN) [Khan, 2004; Langseth and Portinale, 2007; Moubray, 2001]. 
 
Whilst numerous RA tools are discussed in literature, current research effort is largely 
directed towards enhancing the capabilities of individual tools. However, such improvements 
seldom take into account the practical use of these tools in maintenance decision making.  For 
instance, Liu et al. [2013] reviews research focused on FMEA where the conventional risk 
priority number (RPN) is enhanced. Here, some enhancements include adapting linear 
programming and fuzzy rule base approaches. However, such enhancements often increase 
the complexity of the FMEA, thus inhibiting its use in maintenance decision making. 
Moreover, the maintenance decision makers are often confronted by numerous RA tools and 
selecting an appropriate tool can be quite a daunting task. This is attributed to the lack of a 
clear selection framework. Thus, in absence of such a selection framework, the decision 
maker may opt for an ad-hoc selection or not use a specific RA tool at all. Yet, these tools 
play a vital role in structured maintenance decision making where failure risks are identified, 
prioritized and mitigated [Pintelon, 2006].  
 
To address the aforementioned gap, this paper proposes a generic RA tool selection model. 
The objective of the selection model is to propose a structured framework for selecting 
appropriate RA tool(s) best suited for the organization. This paper is organized as follows. 
Section 2 describes different RA tools applicable in maintenance decision making. Section 3 
reviews current literature on RA tools where classification schemes and selection frameworks 
are discussed. Next, the different steps that constitute the methodology are presented starting 
with deriving the generic selection criteria, followed by prioritizing the selection criteria using 
the ANP approach, and lastly developing the audit and selection model.  Finally, the results 
are presented in Section 4.  
2. Theoretical Background 
2.1 Situating risk assessment in maintenance decision making 
Maintenance decision making encompasses several important aspects which include decision 
support, resource management and performance assessment [Pintelon, 2006]. Indeed 
maintenance decision support has received considerable research attention given that it 
addresses important aspects influencing the maintenance function. These aspects include the 
maintenance action, maintenance policy and maintenance concept [Pintelon, 2006].  
Ideally, maintenance action(s) implies the elementary interventions performed by the 
technician where common actions include repair or equipment restoration following 
breakdown [Pintelon, 2006]. Often, the maintenance actions are dependent on specific 
maintenance policy(s). For instance, corrective maintenance actions are considered in failure 
based maintenance (FBM). In addition to FBM, well-known maintenance policy(s) include 
the use/time based maintenance (UBM/TBM), condition based maintenance (CBM) and 
opportunity based maintenance (OBM) [Pintelon, 2006]. 
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Often, maintenance actions and policies are planned via a structured decision making 
framework, described through the maintenance concept. The decision structure assists 
decision makers’ select appropriate policy(s) in a structured approach. Well-known 
maintenance concepts include the reliability centered maintenance (RCM) [Moubray, 2001; 
Pintelon, 2006], total productive maintenance (TPM) [Nakajima, 1988], and risk based 
inspection and maintenance (RBIM) [Khan, 2004]. Notably, several maintenance concepts 
such as the RCM and RBIM are linked to RA tools, where selection of maintenance policy(s) 
is based on failure risk. For instance, the FMEA and FTA are embedded in the RCM and 
RBIM concept respectively. On the other hand, the BN is considered as a stand-alone 
technique, i.e. not linked to any maintenance concept. Nonetheless, the BN is an important 
tool that attempts to replicate the formalism of the FTA especially with regards to modeling 
system dependencies. These dependencies may be technical (i.e. between components), 
functional or logical (e.g. system failure sequence) [Van Horenbeek, 2010]. For this reason, 
the BN is included as a risk assessment technique in this article.   
2.2 Risk assessment classification and selection schemes 
In this section, a brief discussion on several classification schemes for RA tools is presented. 
The schemes are largely based on review articles detailing varied RA techniques. For 
instance, Tixier et al. [2002] reviews 62 RA tools commonly applied in industrial plants. The 
review classifies the techniques according to the type of input data, methodology, and nature 
of output data. Marhavilas [2011] reviews RA tools applicable in manufacturing and process 
facilities and broadly classifies the techniques three groupings, i.e. qualitative, quantitative 
and semi-quantitative techniques. The aforementioned review articles propose classification 
frameworks that could potentially guide users on which tools to adapt for risk assessment.  
 
However, several deficiencies are noted with the classification frameworks discussed above. 
First, several of the RA techniques included in the review are largely qualitative (i.e. describe 
risk in terms such as low, medium, or high). Yet, maintenance decision making is often 
characterized by quantitative risk assessment approaches, e.g. FMEA, FTA or BN [Khan, 
2004; Langseth and Portinale, 2007; Moubray, 2001]. Secondly, some of the techniques in the 
review are not explicitly linked to supporting decision structure, i.e. defined through the 
maintenance concept. As such, applying the proposed classification schemes for selection of 
suitable RA techniques may lead to sub-optimal choices especially in maintenance decision 
making context.  
 
Recently, few research studies proposing RA technique(s) selection frameworks are 
presented.  Notable examples include the ISO 31010; 2009 international standard where 
selection of appropriate RA tools is achieved on the basis of several attributes. Examples of 
these attributes include, resource capacity (e.g. manpower); complexity of the specific 
technique; and type of risk index (qualitative or quantitative). However, the attributes defined 
in the standard are derived in a rather ad-hoc manner, with no systematic approach 
considered.  Dey and Ogunlana [2004] propose a different approach where selection of the 
appropriate RA technique is achieved via a logical decision tree. In the study, a user follows 
several decision variable structured as queries, and as such leading to the right tool. However 
RA tools considered in the study are tailored for project and risk management in civil 
construction projects. As such, suitability of the proposed tools in maintenance decision may 
yield sub-optimal maintenance policy(s). Indeed risks in asset management often differ to 
those in construction project. For instance, construction risks will account for project 
completion time, while as asset maintenance largely focuses on equipment failure. 
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More recently KarimiAzari et al. [2011] formulate the RA tool selection as a multi-criteria 
decision making (MCDM) problem. As such they propose a conceptual selection framework 
based on the fuzzy Technique for Order Preference by Similarity to Ideal Solution (TOPSIS) 
methodology. The TOPSIS is a MCDM technique and based on the premise that the selected 
alternative, i.e. RA tool, should have the shortest distance to the positive ideal solution (PIS) 
and furthest from negative ideal solution (NIS). The study by KarimiAzari et al. [2011] is 
quite important in that it formulates the RA tool selection as a MCDM problem. Likewise, in 
this article, we structure the RA tool selection as an MCDM problem. The study proposes four 
decision making criteria, each assigned priority weights based on the fuzzy TOPSIS approach.  
However, the fuzzy TOPSIS approach ignores inter-dependencies between decisions criteria 
which often influence selection of the right RA tool. For instance, the decision criterion 
“complexity” is assumed independent of “usability of RA tool”. However, it is intuitive that 
the complexity of a certain risk assessment technique influences its usability.  
 
Thus to address some of the above limitations, a RA tool selection model applicable for asset 
maintenance is proposed. The model formulates the selection process as a MCDM problem. 
The proposed approach is based on the analytic network process (ANP) where the inter-
dependencies amongst the decision criteria are taken into account. Moreover, the selection 
model addresses an important gap, i.e. lack of RA tool selection framework specific to the 
asset maintenance domain.  
3. Research Methodology 
In this section, the main steps for developing the conceptual RA tool selection model are 
discussed. The selection model focuses on the maintenance decision making context and 
considers three main RA techniques. These include; the FMEA, FTA and BN. For the FTA 
and BN, a distinction is made between static and dynamic techniques. Thus the DFTA and 
DBN are included in the list of tools evaluated in the selection model.  
The proposed model proposes four main steps namely: 
1. Deriving the generic selection criteria based on extensive literature survey on RA 
tools applicable in maintenance decision making; 
2. Develop ANP model linking the decision criteria to alternative RA tools; 
3. Assign priority weights to the decision criteria and decision elements;  
4. On the basis of assigned priority weights, develop the RA tool selection model that 
allows decision makers evaluate the organization against decision criteria and as a 
consequence select the most appropriate RA tool.  
3.1 Deriving the Generic Selection Criteria 
The first step of the proposed RA tool selection model entails deriving decision criteria 
decision makers ought to consider prior to selecting suitable RA tool. The decision criteria 
and respective elements are derived from extensive review of RA tools applicable in asset 
maintenance. The articles reviewed include articles from electronic databases, journals, 
conference websites, reputed textbooks and well-known standards detailing RA techniques. In 
addition, the search is restricted to quantitative risk assessment techniques applied in 
maintenance decision making. As such, qualitative RA techniques were omitted from the 
review. The databases selected include Google Scholar, Science Direct, and Elsevier. 
Examples of some standards include the US military MIL-STD-1629, the US Navy’s Naval 
Air Systems Command (NAVAIR 00-25-403) and the IEC/ISO 31010. To enhance the search 
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rigor, search terms such as “quantitative risk assessment”, “risk analysis AND maintenance”, 
and “quantitative risk analysis” were used in the search. 
 
Deriving the generic selection criteria follows the approach depicted in Figure 1 and largely 
borrows the risk management process discussed in the ISO 31000 international standard. The 
risk assessment process forms an important part of risk management where three steps are 
described: (1) risk identification; (2) risk analysis; and (3) risk evaluation [IEC, 2009]. The 
assessed risks provide an opportunity for risk mitigation through selecting and implementing 
effective maintenance policy(s). Here, choice of an appropriate maintenance policy is 
achieved through an appropriate decision support structure, described by the maintenance 
concept, e.g. RCM. In asset maintenance, the risk assessment process is aided through varied 
RA tools which include the FMEA, FTA, DFTA, BN and DBN.  
 
However, selecting specific RA tool(s) takes into account several decision elements.  Often, 
such elements are influenced by the type of RA tool and the organizational context. 
Moreover, the elements are linked to the risk assessment process depicted in Figure 1. Thus 
the decision elements are rather varied and constitute tools, aids, materials, documentation, or 
procedures necessary for assessing risk at different stages in the risk assessment process.  
 
For instance, consider a case where the FMEA is applied in risk assessment. At the risk 
identification step, failure modes are identified with the aid of process description diagrams, 
e.g. piping and instrumentation diagrams (P&ID) and maintenance records.  Here, the 
description diagrams facilitate functional analysis where functional failures are identified 
[Moubray, 2001]. In addition, the maintenance staff should possess skills necessary to 
interpret the process description diagrams (e.g. the P&ID) and also perform the functional 
analysis.  
 
In the risk analysis step causes of the functional failures and their potential consequences are 
analyzed. Here, several materials/aids are necessary.  Moreover, important data aspects such 
as spare part costs or production loss are necessary for defining consequence attributed to the 
functional failure [Echeverry and Leverette, 2004]. As such, materials/aids such as 
maintenance cost or failure databases could aid in risk analysis.  Moreover, the databases may 
be linked to customized FMEA software where statistical analysis is achieved via appropriate 
statistical models [Barberá et al., 2012]. As such, important risk metrics such as probability of 
failure and consequence of failure are computed via appropriate failure distributions, e.g. 
Weibull or logistic distribution functions [Braaksma, 2012]. Of course, using the FMEA 
software requires appropriate personnel skills.  
 
The risk evaluation step requires largely the same materials/aids and resources required for 
risk analysis. Indeed, the evaluation step largely entails establishing a suitable risk threshold. 
The threshold in this case could be the maximum allowable maintenance cost derived from 
periodic maintenance budget. Lastly, applying the FMEA technique requires a 
methodological approach, here defined by the RCM. Thus, the material/aids, 
methods/procedures and resources/personnel skills describe requisite decision elements an 
assessor has to consider prior to selecting the FMEA as an appropriate technique for 
conducting FMEA. Although the importance of specific decision elements described above 
may vary, the selection criteria are considered generic and therefore applicable to different 
RA tools, i.e. the FTA and BN. Thus absence of essential decision elements, e.g. low 
personnel skills combined with lack of process description diagrams may result in failure of 
the FMEA exercise.  
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Likewise, the same approach described above is applied for the remaining RA tools, i.e. FTA, 
DFTA, BN and DBN. It is of course intuitive that the aforementioned tools follow the same 
risk assessment process described in Figure 1. As such, the same selection decision elements 
apply to all the tools, thou varying in terms of importance. For instance, the data collection 
schemes (failure/cost databases), statistical models, software tools and personnel skills (e.g. 
statistician) ought to be in place prior to selecting the BN. On the other hand, 
analysis/decision support tools (e.g. P&ID) together with personnel skills (i.e. multi-
disciplinary teams) may suffice for selecting FMEA technique.    
Risk identification
Risk analysis
Risk evaluation
Risk assessment process
Maintenance policy(s):
FBM; TBM/UBM; CBM?
Maintenance Decision 
Support:
RCM; RIBM; BN?
Risk assessment 
techniques:
FMEA; FTA; DFTA; BN; 
DBN 
Statistical models1
Software tools2
Software modules3
Analysis & decision 
support tools
4
Data collection 
schemes 5
Performance 
measurement
6
Methodology/
procedure
7
Personnel skills 8
Selection Criteria Selection Criteria
 
Figure 1: A summary of linkage between the selection decision criteria and risk assessment 
Table 1 presents a summary of 33 generic selection decision elements clustered into 8 
decision criteria derived from literature review.  The decision criteria are denoted SC1 to SC8 
as illustrated in Table 1. From the review, the decision criteria such as “risk analysis and 
decision support tools” consist of five decision elements while some, e.g. the 
“methodology/procedure” consists of three decision elements. The “methodology/procedure” 
cluster details the decision structure linked to the specific RA tool, e.g. FMEA is linked to 
RCM, with FTA likewise linked to RBIM.  
 
Depending on the specific RA tool, it is intuitive that the decision elements vary in 
importance. As such, each decision element clearly has varying priority weights. For this 
reason, a MCDM approach is considered suitable for defining the selection problem. 
Moreover, the decision elements are clearly inter-dependent. For instance, elements in the 
decision cluster “risk analysis and decision support tools” are dependent on the cluster 
“personnel skills”. As such, the ANP methodology is considered as a plausible approach for 
formulating the decision problem.   
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  Decision Criteria Decision elements Tools Author 
SC 1 Software tools 
(1) Computerized maintenance management software (CMMS); (2) Enterprise asset 
management (EAM); (3) Enterprise resource planning (ERP); (4) Dedicated risk 
assessment software, e.g. xFMEA™, Hugin™,  ISOGRAPH™.  
FMEA/FTA/ 
BN 
Barber et.al. [2010]; Echeverry and Leverette [2004]; Äepin and 
Čepin [2002]; Khakzad et.al [2013]; Jones et al. [2010]; 
Langseth and Portinale [2007]; Braaksma et. al. [2012]. 
SC 2 Software modules 
(1) Maintenance budget control; (2) Decision support, e.g. Monte Carlo simulation; (3) 
Report generation (4) Configuration management 
FMEA/ 
FTA/BN 
Braaksma et. al. [2012]; Barber et.al. [2010]; Rausand [1998]; 
Celeux et.al [2006]; Khan [2004]. 
SC 3 
Risk analysis 
and decision 
support tools 
(1) Process description diagrams, e.g. piping and instrumentation diagram (P&ID), 
functional diagrams; (2) Operating and maintenance records, e.g. maintenance records, 
OEM manuals, failure function matrix; (3) Analytic logical techniques: e.g. fault tree, 
event tree, reliability block diagram, Markov diagram, directed acyclic graph; (4) 
Probability paper, e.g. Weibull probability paper; (5) Conditional probability tables, 
questionnaires for deducing conditional & marginal probabilities. 
FMEA/FTA/ 
BN 
Barber et.al. [2010]; Echeverry and Leverette [2004]; Moubray 
[2001]; Braaksma [2012]; Khan [2004]; Volkanovski et al. 
[2009]; Äepin and Čepin [2002]; Jones et.al [2010]; Langseth 
and Portinale [2007]; Weber and Jouffe [2003].  
SC 4 
Data 
collection 
schemes 
(1) Reliability databases; (2) Maintainability data e.g. repair data, rework data; (3) 
Operation/maintenance cost database; (4) Design modification, e.g. re-design, retro-
fitting. (5) Inspection, safety, or environmental damage database. 
FMEA/FTA/ 
BN 
Barber et.al. [2010]; Echeverry and Leverette [2004]; Moubray 
[2001]; Braaksma [2012]; Khan [2004]; Volkanovski et.al. 
[2009]; Äepin and Čepin [2002]; Jones et.al. [2010]; Celeux 
et.al. [2006]; Portinale et.al. [2010]; Weber and Jouffe [2003].  
SC 5 Statistical models 
(1) Failure functions, e.g. Weibull, gamma, exponential; (2) Maintenance optimization 
models, e.g. inspection/maintenance interval optimization; (3) Damage/deterioration 
models, e.g. corrosion or wear; (4) Maintainability models, e.g. perfect repair, imperfect 
repair; (5) Bayesian inference algorithms (Markov chain - Monte Carlo, M-Hastings). 
FMEA/ 
FTA/BN 
Echeverry and Leverette [2004]; Braaksma [2012]; Crocker and 
Kumar [2000]; Khan [2004]; Äepin and Čepin [2002]; Langseth 
and Portinale [2007]; Jones et.al. [2010]; Weber and Jouffe 
[2003].  
SC 6 Performance measurement 
(1) Functional analysis statements (operational/maintenance performance standards); (2) 
Operational/maintenance indicators; (3) System loss indicators. 
FMEA/ 
FT/BN 
 Echeverry and Leverette [2004]; Khan [2004]; Moubray [2001] 
Khakzad et.al. [2013]; Portinale et.al. [2010]. 
SC 7 Methodology/procedure 
(1) Reliability centered maintenance (RCM); (2) Risk based inspection and maintenance; 
(3) Bayesian inferential statistics. 
FMEA/FTA/ 
BN 
Echeverry and Leverette [2004]; Moubray [2001]; Khan [2003]; 
Volkanovski et.al. [2009]; Portinale et.al. [2010]. 
SC 8 Personnel skills 
(1) Facilitators/statisticians; (2) Multi-disciplinary teams; (3) Expert elicitation 
techniques; (4) Knowledge/skills matrix (i.e. skills on functional analysis, statistical 
analysis, failure reliability analysis).   
FMEA/FTA/ 
BN 
Echeverry and Leverette [2004]; Moubray [2001]; Braaksma 
[2012]; Celeux et.al. [2006]; Langseth and Portinale [2007].   
Table 1: Summary of selection decision criteria and respective elements
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3.2 Developing the Conceptual ANP model  
The ANP methodology, first proposed by Thomas Saaty is a MCDM approach considered 
suitable for complex decision making [Saaty, 2001]. For reasons of brevity, this article only 
demonstrates the applicability of the ANP approach for the RA tool selection problem. As 
such detailed description of the ANP approach is omitted with the interested reader referred to 
the work of Saaty [2001]. Essentially, the decision problem is formulated through the ANP 
network structure incorporating relationships between decision clusters.  
The ANP model defined in Figure 2 is developed by the authors for illustrative purposes and 
consists of eight decision clusters namely SC1 to SC8. Moreover, two types of influences are 
depicted, i.e. the outer and inner influence. The outer influence compares the influence of 
elements in one cluster against those of a different decision cluster given a control criterion 
.e.g. comparing SC 3 to SC 4.  The control criterion in this case implies selecting one of the 
RA tool, e.g. FMEA. On the other hand, the inner influence compares the influence of 
elements within a given decision cluster, e.g. comparing of elements within the decision 
cluster SC3. This implies that for each alternative, i.e. RA technique, a different ANP network 
is developed. For ease in representation, the outer dependence is represented by straight 
arrows while loops represent the inner dependence. 
 
Figure 2: The conceptual ANP model 
 
Ideally, the ANP network structure is developed based on expert judgment and requires an 
intuitive understanding of the decision problem [Saaty, 2001]. Here, the decision problem is 
characterized by three aspects namely the goal, control criterion and alternatives. Thus the 
overall goal considered in this article is prioritizing the decision elements and criteria 
necessary for selecting a specific RA tool(s). The selection model is developed separately on 
the basis of the priority weights derived through the ANP methodology. A detailed discussion 
of the selection model is presented in Section 3.4. It is also important to mention here that the 
ANP structure depicted in Figure 2 is illustrative for FMEA selection, but ideally, varies 
depending on the RA tool under consideration.  
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Indeed, depending on the decision makers, some of the decision clusters or elements in the 
clusters may be omitted or added to the ANP structure. For instance, the decision clusters 
“software tools” and “software modules” may be omitted from the network structure when 
formulating the FMEA selection problem. This may apply to a case where the organization 
intends to implement the convectional RPN approach.  
3.3 Assigning Priorities through Pairwise Comparison 
In this step, the domain experts apply the reciprocal pairwise comparison to the decision 
clusters and respective elements. The judgment is often made in qualitative terms and 
expressed numerically as per the Saaty scale [Saaty, 2001]. The priority weights derived from 
the reciprocal pairwise comparison are entered on the ANP supermatrix consisting of cluster 
matrices. For each cluster matrix, a reciprocal pairwise comparison is considered with respect 
to a control criterion. As such, the control criterion for each matrix varies depending on the 
relationships defined in the ANP network. 
 
Table 2 illustrates an example for the ANP supermatrix derived from the model depicted in 
Figure 2. Here, the control criterion for the decision problem is selecting the FMEA risk 
assessment technique. In the supermatrix (Table 2), the decision clusters are entered on the 
first column at the extreme left and at top of the table, illustrated by abbreviations (i.e. SC1 to 
SC 8). Each variable in the supermatrix represents an individual cluster matrix.  For instance, 
the cluster matrix ‘R’ depicts the reciprocal pairwise comparison for decision elements in the 
“analysis/decision support tools” decision cluster and illustrated in Table 3. Moreover, Table 
3 illustrates an example of inner dependency amongst elements in a decision cluster.  
 
On the other hand, variables represented with subscripts, illustrate outer dependence between 
two decision clusters with respect to the control criterion. For instance B1 illustrates the outer 
dependence for elements in the “software modules” with respect to elements of the decision 
cluster “software tools”. Table 4 illustrates the outer dependence of the decision clusters SC1 
to SC8 with respect to selecting the FMEA technique. The dependencies, illustrated using 
variables are also depicted in Figure 2. 
 
Selection criteria SC1 SC2 SC3 SC4 SC5 SC6 SC7 SC8
Software tools  A B2 C2 D2 E2   H2
Software modules B1 K2 L2   
Analysis/decision support tools C1 K1 R S2   
Data collection schemes D1 L1 S1 Y Z2 Aa2  Cc2
Statistical models E1 Z1 DD Ee2 Ff2 
Performance measurement Aa1 Ee1 HH Jj2 Kk2
Methodology/procedure Ff1 Jj1  
Personnel skills H1 Cc1 Kk1  NN 
Table 2: The supermatrix for FMEA risk assessment tool 
It is worth noting that in Table 3, two decision elements, the analytic logic techniques (ALT) 
and conditional probability tables (CPT) are dropped from the pairwise comparison with 
respect to FMEA. The reason for the emission is due to the fact that ALT tools such as fault 
trees, and the CPT are not considered essential for the conventional FMEA approach where 
the RPN is computed. The CPT is primarily applies to the BN tool where inferential statistics 
apply. However, the probability paper is considered essential for quantitative FMEA 
approaches where the occurrence (O) metric is substituted with failure distribution functions, 
e.g. Weibull function. This illustrates the flexibility of the ANP network structure illustrated 
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in Figure 2 where the structure is easily customized depending on the decision problem at 
hand.  
FMEA PDD O&M-R PP Priorities CR 
Process description diagrams (PDD) 1 2 6 0,478 
Operation and maintenance records (O&M-R) 1/2 1 7 0,452 0,073 
Probability paper (PP) 1/6 1/7 1 0,070 
Table 3: Pairwise comparison for elements in the analysis and decision support tools cluster 
The priorities illustrated in Table 3 and 4 are in each case derived from the reciprocal pairwise 
comparison and describe the relative importance of the decision (element/cluster) with respect 
selecting the FMEA. The scores depicted in Table 3 and Table 4 are assigned by the authors 
for illustrative purposes. Moreover, the assigned scores for pairwise comparison are evaluated 
for consistency, i.e. using the consistency ratios. Thus consistency ratios exceeding a value of 
0.1 imply inconsistent judgments.  
 
Based on the priorities derived from the individual cluster matrices, and represented in Table 
3 and 4, the un-weighted supermatrix is constructed.  Here, the derived priorities are located 
on columns in the un-weighted supermatrix. Next, columns of the un-weighted supermatrix 
are normalized thus transforming to the weighted supermatrix. Here, each column of the 
supermatrix sums up to 1. Finally, the weighted supermatrix is raised to powers until 
convergence is achieved, thus resulting in the limit supermatrix where each column in the 
supermatrix is column stochastic. As such the limiting priority weights depicted in Table 5 are 
replicated in each column of the ANP supermatrix.  
FMEA SC1 SC2 SC3 SC4 SC5 SC6 SC7 SC8 Priorities CR 
Software tools  1 4  1/5  1/3  1/2  1/4  1/5  1/7 0,0472   
Software modules  1/4 1  1/5  1/4  1/2  1/3  1/6  1/6 0,0204   
Analysis/decision support tools 5 5 1 3 4 3  1/3  1/7 0,1529   
Data collection schemes 3 4  1/3 1 3 4  1/4  1/4 0,1127 0,10 
Statistical models 2 2  1/4  1/3 1  1/2  1/7  1/8 0,0452   
Performance measurement 4 3  1/3  1/4 2 1  1/7  1/8 0,0772   
Methodology/procedure 5 6 3 4    7 7 1  1/2 0,2384   
Personnel skills 7 6 7 4    8 8 2 1 0,3060   
Table 4: Pairwise comparison for the decision clusters with respect to FMEA 
Table 5 illustrates the values of the limit supermatrix for decision elements with respect to the 
FMEA. Since the limiting values are column stochastic, the values represent the priority 
weights for the decision elements with respect to selecting the FMEA technique. Moreover, 
the priority weights may be ranked according to their relative importance as illustrated on the 
last column of Table 5. Thus as per the scores assigned by the authors, it seems that investing 
in a dedicated FMEA software is the most important decision element (ranked 1st). On the 
other hand, incorporating the ‘report generation’ software module into existing FMEA 
software is the least important decision element (ranked 25th). Thus, the ANP methodology 
presents an intuitive approach through which the decision makers can identify the most 
important decision elements the organization requires to focus on prior to selecting a 
particular risk assessment technique. By adapting the approach discussed in this section, 
priority weights are thus derived for each RA tool and form the basis for developing the 
selection model discussed in the next section.  
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Decision cluster 
 
Decision elements 
ANP limit matrix 
Weight  Ranking 
Software tools  Computerised maintenance management system  0.03792 13 
Enterprise asset management  0.01523 22 
Enterprise resource planning   0.01325 23 
Dedicated FMEA software  0.07845 1 
Software modules Maintenance budget control  0.01997 18 
Decision making  0.04689 12 
Report generation  0.00794 26 
Configuration management   0.06086 4 
Analysis/decision support tools  Process description diagrams  0.06405 6 
Operation and maintenance records   0.06851 3 
Probability paper  0.01075 25 
Data collection schemes  Reliability database   0.05357 9 
Maintainability database   0.05714 7 
Operation/maintenance cost database  0.01786 20 
Safety/environmental consequence database   0.01743 21 
Statistical models  Failure functions   0.05425 8 
Monte carlo analysis   0.04762 11 
Damage/deterioration model(s)   0.01832 19 
Performance measurement Functional analysis statement(s)   0.06708 5 
Operation & maintenance performance indicator(s)   0.02497 16 
Operation & maintenance performance standard(s)   0.02484 17 
System loss indicator(s)   0.02609 15 
Personnel skills  Facilitator(s)  0.04822 10 
Multi-disciplinary team  0.07845 2 
Expert elicitation technique(s)  0.01125 24 
Knowledge/skills matrix   0.02913 14 
 
Table 5: The limiting supermatrix for FMEA risk assessment tool 
 
3.4 Risk assessment tool selection model 
The selection model builds on the previous steps discussed in Section 3.3 and presents a 
plausible framework for selecting the most appropriate technique amongst several 
alternatives.  Moreover, the model allows the organization to evaluate itself against the 
prioritized decision elements. Developing the selection model entails the following steps:  
1) The decision elements for each RA tool are prioritized following the approach 
described in Section 3.3.  Since the decision elements are generic, the same decision 
elements apply to all the RA tools considered in this article. However, the weights 
vary depending on the specific RA tool;  
2) Next, each decision element (Di) is assigned a relative score (Si) ranging from ‘1’ to 
‘5’. The assigned score evaluates the preparedness of the organization relative a 
decision element. For instance an organization with well-organized process 
description diagrams would assign a high score (e.g. 5) compared to one where the 
same diagrams are not well organized (i.e. assigned a score of 1); 
3) The assigned score (S) is multiplied with its relative limiting priority weight (Wij) 
(see Table 5). Here, the product of the aforementioned metrics likewise varies from 
‘1’ to ‘5’. This approach is implemented for each of the risk assessment techniques 
(i.e. RT1 to RT5). 
4) The values computed in Step 3 above are summed to obtain a weighted score. Here, 
the final score is influenced by the varying priority weights of the individual priority 
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weights. However the score assigned by the decision makers applies for all risk 
assessment techniques. This results in differentiated final weighted scores.  
5) Select the most appropriate risk assessment tool based on the value of the weighted 
score. Here, the technique considered most appropriate is one having the highest 
weighted score.  
 
Decision 
elements (Di) 
Assigned score 
(Si) 
ANP importance weighting (W) 
RT1 RT2 RT3 RT4 RT5 
D1 S1 W11 W21 W31 W41 W51 
D2 S2 W12 W22 W32 W42 W52 
D3 S3 W13 W23 W33 W43 W53 
↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ 
Dn Sn W1n W2n W3n W2n W5n 
 Weighted score ∑ ×= n ii WS
1
1
 ∑ ×= n ii WS
1
2
 ∑ ×= n iWS
1
3 ∑ ×= n iWS
1
4
 ∑ ×= n iWS
1
5
 
Table 6: Audit and risk assessment tool selection model 
4. Conclusion 
This paper presents a methodology for selecting the most appropriate risk assessment 
technique/tool for decision making in the asset maintenance context. The methodology is 
based on the analytic network process (ANP). It addresses an important decision making 
concern where maintenance practitioners are often confronted with diverse risk assessment 
techniques. However selecting the most appropriate technique is not so straightforward. Yet, 
risk assessment techniques play a vital role in maintenance decision making given that the 
techniques aid in systematically identifying, analyzing, evaluating and mitigating asset failure 
risks. The proposed selection model is based on priority weights derived by domain experts 
knowledgeable on use of the different techniques. Moreover, the selection model allows 
decision makers assess their “as-is” situation against the decision elements against which a 
weighted score is computed. Based on the weighted score, the most appropriate technique is 
selected amongst several alternatives.  
 
However some limitations of the proposed approach need to be emphasized. The approach 
largely depends on knowledge of domain experts well-versed with the RA tools considered in 
this study. However, some techniques, e.g. the Bayesian networks are largely academic and 
seldom applied by maintenance practitioners. Moreover, the ANP methodology is considered 
costly, in terms of time given the number of cluster matrices required in the exercise. 
Nevertheless, the proposed approach attempts to address an important gap in practice by 
proposing a structured framework for selecting appropriate assessment techniques. Moreover, 
the selection model accounts for organizational capabilities, defined through the decision 
elements. Proposed future work will focus on validating the proposed methodology through 
case studies where the suitability of the selection model is evaluated. Moreover, comparative 
analysis where two or more risk assessment tools are used in combination will be evaluated in 
future work. 
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